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I will discuss the part of the Code1 that I think is the most
controversial and perhaps, in some respects, the most important.
The area to which I refer is Part XVII on damages and private
actions.' I will give an overview and leave to subsequent
speakers the opportunity of providing particular expositions on
problems of significance.
In terms of the whole Code, the two questions most worthy
of note are:
1. whether the Code objectifies and therefore improves the
registration and exemption process, and
2. whether the Code successfully sorts out the private liabil-
ity question. The Code attempts to order the area of private lia-
bility by setting up a discrete set of express rights of action, with
the requisite mental state and damage consequences for each
action.3
* J.S.D., 1973, Yale; J.S., 1972, Yale; A.B., 1968, Harvard University. Partner, Cap-
lin & Drysdale, Washington, D.C., and Adjunct Professor at Georgetown Law Center;
formerly, at the time this speech was given, Associate General Counsel, Securities and
Exchange Commission; Associate Professor, New York University.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsi-
bility for any private publication by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are
those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the
author's colleagues on the staff of the Commission.
1. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (1980) (Official Draft). References in this speech are to the
1980 draft. On Sept. 30, 1980, the Securities and Exchange Commission published, in an
agency release,-changes to the 1980 draft which were agreed upon by Professor Loss and
the Commission. SEC Sec. Act Release No. 33-6242, 20 SEC Docket 1483 (1980) [herein-
after referred to and cited as CODE RECOMMENDATION].




A. Sources of Substantive Violations
At first glance, the method by which you find a private ac-
tion in the Code is complex. Once you become adept at tracing
the substantive violation through to Part XVI and then through
to the damage provision, however, it becomes apparent that the
Code does present a coherent picture. Part XVII does not in it-
self create many violations; it creates private rights of action.
The substantive violations, for the most part, appear elsewhere
in the Code, mostly in Part XVI.
Generally, the methodology is as follows: look for a violation
of substantive law in Part XVI, and then look to Part XVII for
its analogue which grants a private damage action. Look also to
Part XVIII for the action's administrative analogue-a Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission injunctive action or administra-
tive proceeding. But remember that Part XVI is not the only
section that establishes violations: Parts V, VI, and VII, for ex-
ample, supply the substantive law with respect to registration
violations, and Parts VIII and IX, the substantive law with re-
spect to broker-dealer violations. Thus, in order to properly.ana-
lyze Part XVII on private damages, one must first locate the vio-
lation of substantive law in some other parts of the Code and
then return to Part XVII.
B. Recognition of Implied Private Rights of Action
Although the Code has set up several express private rights
of action, it also has a unique provision in section 1722(a) which
might be called an express recognition of implied private rights
of action.4 Basically, it is a restatement of the Cort v. Ash' test
4. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1722(a) (1980). This section provides in relevant part:
(a) IMPLIED ACTION.-A court, considering the nature of the defendant's con-
duct, the degree of his culpability, the injury suffered by the plaintiff, and the
deterrent effect of recognizing a private action based on a violation of this Code,
may recognize such an action even though it is not expressly created by part
XVII, but only if (1) the action is not inconsistent with the conditions or restric-
tions in any of the actions expressly created or with the scheme of this Code, (2)
the provision, rule, or order that is the basis of the action is designed for the
special benefit of a class of persons to which the plaintiff belongs against the kind
of harm alleged, (3) the plaintiff satisfies the court that under the circumstances
the type of remedy sought is not disproportionate to the alleged violation, and (4)
in cases comparable to those dealt with in section 1702(e)(2) or 1708(c)(2) or a
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for implied private rights of action. In this context, the Code, if
enacted, would provide the express Congressional authority nec-
essary to justify a court's implication of private rights in appro-
priate cases in this area. This express Congressional recognition
could be decisive in view of recent Supreme Court decisions.6
Without this provision, one could argue that the Code is such a
tightly written document that the authors meant to exclude all
private rights of action not expressly included. But section 1722
anticipates and answers this argument by recognizing that im-
plied private rights of action are appropriate as supplements to
the private rights of action that follow through from the other
parts of the Code.
C. Statute of Limitations
Another thing of a general nature that should be kept in
similar provision that specifies a maximum measure of damages, a comparable
maximum is imposed.
5. In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Court formulated a four-part test for
implying private rights of action in federal legislation when Congress is silent:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted,". . .? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or im-
plicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?. . . Third, is it consistent
with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for
the plaintiff?. . . And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to
state law, in an area basically the concern of the States ... ?
Id. at 78 (citations omitted).
Section 1722 of the proposed Code, however, does not mention one factor considered
important in Cort: the availability of a state cause of action. Comment (12) to section
1721(c) explains as follows:
The criteria do not include the availability of an action under state law, because in
the Code's context that criterion runs in both directions: On the one hand, why
needlessly add a federal action? On the other hand, the very availability of a non-
statutory action might be thought to bespeak uniform federal coverage in a Code
that regulates the conduct of brokers and dealers.
ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1721(c), Comment (12) (1980).
6. See, e.g., Touche.Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). The court did not
imply a private right of action under § 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
"The ultimate question [for the implication of private causes of action] is one of congres-
sional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks that it can improve upon the statu-
tory scheme that Congress enacted into law." 442 U.S. at 578. See also Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979). In this case the Court held that no
private cause of action for damages can be implied under § 206 of the Investment Ad-
visers Act of 1940. "The dispositive question remains whether Congress intended to
create any such remedy." 444 U.S. at 24.
1981]
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mind is that the Code clearly sets out a statute of limitations.' I
think this would be very helpful, especially in the 10b-5 area,
where the problem of determining the statute of limitations has
been a technicality that has plagued many courts."
II. A Comparison of Causes of Action in the Proposed Code
with Those Presently Available
A. Failure to File a Registration Statement
To obtain a complete picture of the Code's proposed scheme
for the area now regulated by section 12(1)1 it is necessary to
group together the various registration provisions found in the
new Code. The analysis starts with section 1702.10 This is quite
similar to the present handling of liability on registration under
section 12(1)." Liability under section 1702 arises when the re-
quirement to file a registration or offering statement has not
been obeyed.12 This duty to file a registration statement may
7. ALI FEn. SEC. CODE § 1727 (1980).
8. A number of federal courts, in dealing with implied § 10(b) claims, have adopted
the applicable state law period of limitations. This has had the effect of limiting the
commencement period. See, e.g., Forrestal Village, Inc. v. Graham, 551 F.2d 411, 413
(D.C. Cir. 1977); Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 409 (2d Cir. 1975);
Hudak v. Economic Research Analysts, Inc., 499 F.2d 996, 1000-02 (5th Cir. 1974); Van-
derboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1236-38 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970).
Cf., Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123, 128 (7th Cir. 1972) (employing an
equitable tolling doctrine to determine when the Illinois Securities Law three-year stat-
ute of limitations runs).
9. Securities Act of 1933, § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1976).
10. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1702 (1980).
11. Compare Securities Act of 1933, § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1976) with ALl FED.
SEC. CODE § 1702(a) (1980). Comment (1)(a) to § 1702(a) states:
Those non-fraud-type violations that have to do with sales or purchases of
securities are treated in this section on the model of S12(1) if . . . they are
designed essentially to protect the buyer or seller in the particular transaction
rather than to regulate the industry generally.
ALI FED. SEc. CODE § 1702 (a), Comment (1)(a) (1980).
12. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1702(a) (1980). This section provides:
(a) TRANSACTIONS NOT EFFECTED IN THE MARKET.-If the transaction is not
effected in a manner that would make the matching of buyers and sellers substan-
tially fortuitous, any of the following sellers or buyers is liable to his buyer or
seller for rescission or damages:
(1) a person who sells or confirms a sale of a security, delivers a security after
sale, or -accepts payment for a security in violation of section 504(a);
(2) a person who sells a security in violation of section 1402, 1405, 1408,
1411(b)(1), 1414, 1416(a), 1421(a), 1422, 1423, or 1504(a), or a rule under section
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss2/6
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arise under section 504, or other sections, of the new Code."3 All
of the registration violations in the new Code feed into section
1702 which establishes strict liability for these violations." This
is similar to present law, in that the failure to register leads to
strict liability; however, there are a few curlicues in section 1702
that make it different from the strict liability now present in
section 12(1). First, certain good faith defenses are found in sev-
eral of the registration sections of the proposed Code which cre-
ate the substantive violations. For example, if you violated what
is now the intra-state exemption but could show a good faith
defense, you would not be strictly liable.1 5 Second, a special de-
fense, called the "mitigation defense," appears in section 1702(c)
of the Code." It is not really a defense but is a provision which
empowers the court, assuming you meet the requirements of sec-
tion 1702(c), to reduce significantly, or eliminate, the amount of
damages.1 7
Thus, to understand fully the Code's proposed scheme for
the area now covered by section 12(1) and to get a general sense
of the Code's treatment of strict liability for registration viola-
tions, all the various registration provisions must be put to-
gether. This would include a consideration of the good faith
1418(b) or 1418(c)(2);
(3) a person who buys a security in violation of section 1405 or 1411(b)(2), or
a rule under section 1418(b); or
(4) a person who sells or buys a security while in violation of section 402 or
403 with respect to that security.
13. Id.
14. ALl FED. SEC. CODE § 1702 (1980). Section 1702(c), however, contemplates a
limited good faith defense to strict liability for a violation of § 1702(a), in order to miti-
gate unduly harsh results which may arise "because [of] the indefiniteness of much of
the underlying substantive law." Id. at Comment (2). This subsection, § 1702(c), has
been entirely deleted in CODE RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, at 1497. The comment to
section 1702(c) explains the deletion as follows:
Section 1702(c) is deleted because (1) it would concededly have complicated
litigation under the otherwise strict liability approach of § 1702, and (2) the Code
reduces much of both the vagueness and the absolutism of the underlying sub-
stantive law.
15. ALl FED. SEC. CODE § 514(d)(2) (1980). This section provides:
An original seller or a reseller who in good faith accepts from this buyer a
written undertaking that is reasonably designed to avoid an illegal distribution
and complies with any rule adopted under this section is not considered to be a
participant in any such distribution.
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defenses available elsewhere in the Code and would include a
consideration of the reduction of damage provision available in
section 1702(c).
B. Sales and Purchases Tainted with Fraud and
Misrepresentation
The second part of the proposed Code's treatment of pri-
vate liability that I will discuss involves the treatment of sales
and purchases tainted by fraud or misrepresentation.1 8 Sections
1602,19 1603,20 and 161321 establish the substantive violations for
18. ALI FED. SEC. CODE §§ 1601-1614 (1980). The Comment on the Scheme of Part
XVI states:
This part gathers all the existing provisions (and a few new ones) that smack of
fraud, misrepresentation or manipulation, as distinct from provisions like X Rule
10b-10 (on confirmations) or X9(b)-(d)(on puts and calls) or X10(a)(on short sales
and stop-loss orders) or various manifestations of the "shingle theory" as applied
to dealers. . . all of which, though found with the provisions on fraud and manip-
ulation, are more appropriate for Part IX (Market Regulation).
ALI FED. SEC. CODE, Comment on the Scheme to Part XVI (1980) (citations omitted).
19. Id. § 1602(a). This section provides:
(a) GENERAL.-It is unlawful for any person to engage in a fraudulent act or
to make a misrepresentation in connection with (1) a sale or purchase of a secur-
ity, an offer to sell or buy a security, or an inducement not to buy or sell a secur-
ity, (2) a proxy solicitation or other circularization of security holders with respect
to a security of a registrant, (3) a tender offer or a recommendation to security
holders in favor of or opposition to a tender offer, or (4) any activity or proposed
activity by an investment adviser with respect to a client or a prospective client.
20. Id. § 1603. This section provides:
(a) GENERAL.-It is unlawful for an insider to sell or buy a security of the
issuer, if he knows a fact of special significance with respect to the issuer or the
security that is not generally available, unless (1) the insider reasonably believes
that the fact is generally available, or (2) the identity of the other party to the
transaction (or his agent) is known to the insider and (A) the insider reasonably
believes that that party (or his agent) knows the fact, or (B) that party (or his
agent) knows the fact from the insider or otherwise.
(b) For purposes of section 1603, "insider" means (1) the issuer, (2) a director
or officer of, or a person controlling, controlled by, or under common control with,
the issuer, (3) a person who, by virtue of his relationship or former relationship to
the issuer, knows a fact of special significance about the issuer or the security in
question that is not generally available, or (4) a person who learns such a fact
from a person within section 1603(b) (including a person within section
1603(b)(4)) with knowledge that the person from whom he learns the fact is such a
person, unless the Commission or a court finds that it would be inequitable, on
consideration of the circumstances and the purposes of this Code (including the
deterrent effect of liability), to treat the person within section 1603(b)(4) as if he
were within section 1603(b)(1), (2), or (3).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss2/6
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which damages can be obtained by a private plaintiff under sec-
tion 1703.22 Sections 1602 and 1603 establish the general anti-
fraud prohibitions23 and the insider trading provisions of the
Code.24
These sections draw a distinction between face-to-face
transactions and anonymous market transactions. In face-to-face
transactions defenses are available and the measure of damages
is basically limited to the defendant's profit.25 Query: what hap-
pened to the rescission right contained in section 29(b) of the
1934 Act? 26 Right now you can argue that under the Lewis case 2
The CODE RECOMMENDATION makes major changes in this section. "In the introductory
portion, 'material fact' has been substituted for fact of 'special significance'." CODE REC-
OMMENDATION, supra note 1, at 1495. A new subsection, § 1603(a)(3), has been added to
provide a defense. The comment explains:
[T]he plaintiff need allege and prove only materiality, after which . . . the
burden of going forward will shift to the defendant to show lack of special
significance.
21. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1613 (1980). This section provides:
, The Commission, in order to prevent violation of section 1602(a)(1), 1603(a),
or 1604(c) by a registrant buying a security of which it is the issuer, may require
by rule that the registrant provide holders of securities of the class with whatever
information (including source of funds, number of securities to be purchased,
price to be paid, and method of purchase) the Commission considers necessary
and material to a determination whether the security should be sold. For purposes
of section 1613, a purchase by a registrant's controlling, controlled, or commonly
controlled person, or a purchase subject to the control of the issuer or any such
person, is considered to be a purchase by the registrant. See also section 607(b).
22. Id. § 1703. This section provides:
(a) THANSACrIONs NoT Erncr IN THE MARKETs.-If the transaction is not
effected in a manner that would make the matching of buyers and sellers substan-
tially fortuitous, a seller or buyer who violates section 1602(a)(1), 1602(b)(1)(A),
1603(a), or 1613 is liable to his buyer or seller for rescission or damages.
(b) TRANSAcTIONs EFpcTED IN THE MARuErs.-If the transaction is effected
in a manner that would make the matching of buyers and sellers substantially
fortuitous, a seller or buyer who violates section 1602(a)(1), 1602(b)(1)(A),
1603(a), or 1613 is liable for damages to a person who buys or sells during the
period beginning at the start of the day when the defendant first unlawfully sells
or buys, and ending at the end of the day when all material facts (or facts of
special significance in the case of section 1603(a)) become generally available.
23. Id. § 1602. For the text of this section in relevant part, see note 19 supra.
24. Id. § 1603. For the text of this section, see note 17 supra.
25. Id. § 1703(d) (Defense of Correction), § 1703(e) (Defense of Plaintiff's Knowl-
edge), 1703(f) (Defenses Based on Defendant's Conduct), 1703(i) (Measure of Damages).
26. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 29(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1976).
27. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979). This case
is discussed in another context at note 6 supra.
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there is a rescission right in section 215 of the Advisers Act28
that could be extended to section 29(b) of the 1934 Act where
there is similar language which says that all contracts could be
void. One could ask whether, at least in face-to-face transac-
tions, the Code should have an analogue to this rescission right.
I think you would expect that if such a right were to appear
anywhere in the Code, it would appear in face-to-face transac-
tions involving fraud. Section 1703(a), the basic damages provi-
sion for fraud in face-to-face transactions, does not provide a re-
scission right because of the defenses provided in the rest of
section 1703. While section 1722(c) provides a rescission right, it
is quite limited in scope.29 So while the Code expands the pre-
28. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 215, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1976).
29. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1722(c) (1980). This section provides:
(C) ILLEGAL CONTRACT..-(1) When one party to a contract (herein "the first
party") would be liable to another party under any provision of part XVII (other
than section 1722(a)) if the contract were consummated, or when a broker, dealer,
municipal broker, municipal dealer, or investment adviser makes a contract in vio-
lation of section 702(a) or 919(a), the contract is not enforceable by the first party
or by the broker, dealer, municipal broker, municipal dealer, or investment ad-
viser (or by any nonparty to the contract who acquired a right under the contract
from the first party or from the broker, dealer, municipal broker, municipal
dealer, or investment adviser with knowledge of the facts by reason of which that
person would be so liable) unless the plaintiff satisfies the court that under the
circumstances enforcement would further the purposes of this Code better than
nonenforcement.
(2) Any other contract is enforceable by a person specified in section
1722(c)(1) notwithstanding a defense of illegality under this Code unless the de-
fendant satisfies the court that under the circumstances nonenforcement of the
contract and the deterrent effect of nonenforcement would not be disproportion-
ate to the violation and the degree of culpability on the part of the plaintiff (or
the alleged violator from whom the plaintiff as a nonparty to the contract ac-
quired a right under the contract).
(3) Violation of a rule of a national securities exchange or a registered securi-
ties association or clearing agency that is not actionable under section 1721(a) is
not made a defense to an action on a contract by this Code.
(4) Section 1722(c)(1) to (3) inclusive does not apply for purposes of sections
504(b) and 1724(e)(2) and (3).
The CODE RECOMMENDATION suggests the deletion of § 1722(c) and the substitution
of the following language:
(c) ILLEGAL CONTRACTS:-(1) A contract that is made, or whose per-
formance involves, a violation of this Code (or of a rule of a self-regulatory organi-
zation within section 1721(a)) is unenforceable by either party (or by a nonparty
to the contract who acquired a right under the contract with knowledge of the
facts by reason of which the making or performance violated or would violate this
Code) unless the plaintiff satisfies the court that under the circumstances enforce-
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss2/6
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sent law by establishing more express private rights of action
than we have now, it seems to cut back from present law by not
having a provision similar to section 29(b) of the 1934 Act which
constitutes a rather broad rescission right.
Now let us look at the Code's handling of anonymous mar-
ket transactions.8 0 The problem here, one that we all have seen,
is that when someone trades in an anonymous market, it seems
unfair for a defendant who has made a small profit, say ten
thousand dollars, to suffer a large liability, say two to five mil-
lion dollars. Furthermore, it is often very difficult for a plaintiff
to trace the purchase or sale to a particular person on the other
side. Professor Loss has confronted this problem, and the Code
effectively limits the damages to the defendant's profits, by pro-
viding that in any action under section 1703, damages are mea-
sured as if all plaintiffs bought or sold only the amount of secur-
ities defendant bought or sold.8 ' The Commission's staff has
ment would produce a more equitable result than nonenforcement and would not
be inconsistent with the purposes of this Code.
(2) To the extent that a contract described in section 1727(c)(1) has been
performed, the court may not deny rescission at the instance of any party unless
the defendant satisfies the court that under the circumstances the denial of rescis-
sion would produce a more equitable result than its grant and would not be incon-
sistent with the purposes of this Code.
(3) Section 1722(c)(1) and (2) does not apply (A) to the extent that the un-
lawful portion of the contract may be severed, (B) to preclude recovery against
any person for unjust enrichment, or (C) for purposes of sections 504(b) and
1724(e)(2) and (3).
CODE RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, at 1501.
30. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1602 (1980).
31. Id. § 1708(b). This section provides:
(b) FOR SECTION 1703(b).-The measure of damages under section 1703(b) is
computed as in section 1708(a), except that-
(1) sections 1703(h)(1)(B), 1708(a)(1)(A), and 1708(a)(2)(A) do not apply;
(2) the measure is reduced to the extent (which may be complete) that the
defendant proves that the violation did not cause the loss; and
(3) the measure (apart from any assessment of consequential damages or costs
under section 1723(a) and (d)) is limited as if all the plaintiffs, together with all
the members of the class in the case of a class action, had bought (or sold) only
the amount of securities that the defendant had sold (or bought).
Comment 5 explains the theory as follows: "a seller (or buyer) who misrepresents should
have the same liability whether he sells (or buys) face to face or in the market." Id. at
Comment 5. The CODE RECOMMENDATION has added a new subsection, § 1708(b)(4),
which is intended to deter an insider from "going into the marketplace on the basis of
inside information that he knows . . . is undisclosed" by providing that a court may, in




expressed some doubt that a sufficient deterrent effect is pro-
vided by a section requiring only that the defendant return his
profits.32 This creates a situation in which one who has inside
material information and trades on the basis of it must, at worst,
relinquish profits and may, at best, remain undetected. This, as
a practical matter, will happen often. While the Commission
staff believes that open-ended liability may not be appropriate,
the staff has publicly recommended to Professor Loss that he
use a concept, such as double damages, which would provide
substantial deterrence.33 Double damages, essentially, is a nice
way of saying punitive damages. But since double damages are
related mathematically to defendant's profits, such a measure
cannot result in astronomical figures. Any figure used in these
situations will always be arbitrary. A specific, and reasonable,
figure is preferable, but it should be large enough to provide a
deterrent effect.
I should also mention the substantive provision of the pro-
posed Code which deals with insider trading, section 1603."
While current law is concerned here with "material facts,' '3 5 Pro-
fessor Loss does not use that term in this section. He uses the
term a "fact of special significance."3 6 Under the Code, a plain-
tiff would have to prove that the defendant had a "fact of spe-
cial significance" rather than a "material fact." One could de-
bate for a long time whether these standards differ. Thus, it is
note 1, at 1499.
32. See Schorr, Plan to Rewrite Federal Securities Law Appears Close to Being
Endorsed by SEC, Wall St. J., July 31, 1980, at 3, col. 2.
33. The Securities and Exchange Commission recommends an
alteration in the code [which] would make things tougher for persons illegally
trading in securities on the basis of inside information by allowing federal courts
to award injured parties twice the amount of an inside trader's profits. The origi-
nal version would have limited recovery to the actual gain achieved by the insider.
Id. at 3, col. 3. The version of the Code agreed upon by the Commission and Professor
Loss would permit an increase in damages of up to 150 percent of the lost profits. CODE
RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, at 1499.
34. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1603 (1980). For the text of this section, see note 20
supra.
35. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1979), which renders it unlawful "[t]o make
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, .. ."
36. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1603(a) (1980). For the complete text of this section and
changes recommended by the Commission and Professor Loss, see note 20, supra.
[Vol. 1:355
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not clear to me why Professor Loss has changed what is a well
known and much litigated standard. The courts have used the
materiality standard, especially since Northway,7 in a sensible
way, and I am not sure how many cases it would take for us to
understand what the term "fact of special significance" means.
C. False Registration Statements, Offering Statements, and
Annual Reports
My analysis now turns to section 17 0 4U which provides for
liability roughly equivalent to that found in section 11 of the
1933 Act.3 9 Section 11 liability applies to false registration state-
ments, offering statements and annual reports. Section 1704
must be seen in connection with the Code's movement toward
continuous disclosure and reliance on the annual report. 0 Since
the entire system is geared to the annual report, there should be
a duty imposed on officers and directors to read the report care-
fully. The imposition of what can be considered section 11 liabil-
ity for the false preparation of an annual report is a logical re-
sult in the Code.4 '
The similarity between section 11 liability and the Code lia-
bility is not complete; under the new Code, liability in this con-
text is watered-down section 11 liability. This is because there
are more defenses in section 1704 than in section 11.42 There are
37. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). "The general stan-
dard of materiality.. . is as follows: An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to
vote." Id. at 449.
38. ALI FED. SEc. CODE § 1704 (1980).
39. Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).
40. ALI FED. Sac. CODE, Introduction, at xxvii-xxviii, xxxiv (1980).
41. See ALI FED. SEC. CODE, Introductory Comments §§ 1704-1705 (1980).
42. Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976). The defenses, under section
11, include: (1) an affirmative defense that plaintiff knew of the alleged untruth or omis-
sion, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a); (2) a "due diligence" defense, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3); (3) a partial
affirmative defense that the decrease in value of the security was not caused by the par-
ticular misstatement or omission in the registration statement, 15 U.S.C. § 77(e). See,
e.g., In re Gap Stores Sec. Litigation, 79 F.R.D. 283, 297 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (affirmative
defense of plaintiff's knowledge); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 208 n. 26
(1975) ("due diligence" defense); Emmi v. First-Manufacturers National Bank of Lewis-
ton and Auburn, 336 F. Supp. 629, 634 n. 6 (D. Me. 1971) (partial affirmative defense of
lack of causal relationship).
Section 1704 establishes a defense not presently provided in section 11. ALI FED.




a defense of correction, a defense of plaintiff's knowledge, and a
defense based on defendant's conduct.
There has been a tremendous debate about whether this
watered-down liability should apply to directors. 43 Some, includ-
ing Professor Loss himself, think that directors should have that
liability with respect to the annual report. In the latest version
of the proposed Code, Professor Loss has reached a compromise;
he has established a scienter-type liability but has required the
defendant to prove lack of scienter rather than requiring the
plaintiff to prove its presence." Thus the plaintiff puts forth the
prima facie case but the defendant has the burden of proving he
did nothing wrong. 4" Whether this is a successful compromise is
a question that can be answered only after the Code has been in
operation for some time.
D. Filing Requirements Other Than Those Required by
Section 1704
In addition to establishing the filing requirements just dis-
cussed, the Code also provides for other filings. Section 170546
deals with filings other than those required for offerings or an-
nual reports, such as the 8K and the 10Q. In this section, Profes-
sor Loss has established a liability standard that some of us re-
fer to as scienter plus; you must have a misrepresentation made
and due diligence, are found in the Code at § 1704(0 (Defenses Based on Defendant's
Conduct). Id. § 1704(f). The section 11 defense based on plaintiff's knowledge is found in
the Code at § 1704(e) (Defense of Plaintiff's Knowledge). Id. § 1704(e).
43. See, e.g., Patrick, Some Practical Questions Concerning the Effect of the Pro-
posed Federal Securities Code on Civil Litigation, 32 VAND. L. Rav. 551 (1979).
44. ALI FED. SEC. CODE §§ 1704-1705 (1980). The Code provides two alternatives for
liability for the filing of a false annual report. In the introductory comments to sections
1704-1705, Professor Loss states that
[t]he basic differences between §§ 1704 and 1705 have to do with (i) burden
and standard of proof on falsity and (ii) persons liable:
(a) Whereas the § 1704 plaintiff shows merely a misrepresentation under §
1704(a) in order to shift to the defendant the burden of going forward under §
1704(f) with the several due care defenses modeled on [Securities Act of 1933, §
11b, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(1976)], § 1705(a) requires proof of scienter as defined in §
202(147).
Id. at Introductory Comment (3) §§ 1704-1705.
45. Id.
46. Id. § 1705.
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with scienter 4 7
One of the interesting questions that has always bothered
me about this provision is whether a complete failure to file
would make you liable under section 1705. It appears that this is
not fully taken care of by the Code. If you filed and misrepre-
sented a fact, you probably would be liable under section 1705.
But if you had an obligation to file, and you entirely failed to
file, I am not sure you would be liable under this section. To me,
it seems illogical that a total failure to abide by the rule would
not be actionable while submitting a filing which included a mis-
take would be actionable.
E. Other Code Provisions
Liability for false distribution statements is covered in sec-
tion 1706 of the proposed Code.4 s While section 1704 covers the
issuer making an offering, section 1706 reaches the secondary
distributor and delineates his liability.49
Section 1604(c) defines the substantive law with respect to
false publicity;50 section 1707 provides the cause of action;51 and
47. See id. § 1705(a).
48. Id. § 1706. This section provides that
(a) PORTION SUBJECT To SECTION 1704 LI BILrrY.-With respect to those con-
tents of a distribution statement described in section 510(c)(1) and (3), the
secondary distributor and every underwriter have the same liability that a regis-
trant and underwriter, respectively, have under section 1704 to the extent that an
offering statement covers a distribution by or for the account or benefit of the
issuer, except that an underwriter is not liable for a false certification under sec-
tion 510(c)(3) without proof of scienter.
(b) PORTION SUBJECT TO SECTION 1705 LIBiLrr.-With respect to the con-
tents of a distribution statement (other than those contents referred to in section
1706(a)), including reports that are identified or physically attached, the second-
ary distributor and every underwriter have the same liability that a registrant has
under section 1705.
(c) MEAsURE oF DAMAGES.-The measure of damages under section 1705 is
stated in section 1708(c), and the measure of damages under section 1705 is stated
in section 1708(d).
49. Compare ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1706 (1980) with ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1704
(1980).
50. Id. § 1604(c). This section provides that
It is unlawful for any company, or a person acting on its behalf, to engage in a
fraudulent act in connection with, or to make a misrepresentation in, a press re-
lease or other form of publicity (other than a filing) relating to the company if it is
reasonably foreseeable that such conduct will induce other persons to buy, sell, or
not to buy or sell securities of the company or of a controlling, controlled, or com-
13
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section 1708 delineates the damages and the calculation of dam-
ages.52 False publicity statements, according to section 1604(c),
must be made with scienter to be actionable."3
The applicable damage provision sets a ceiling on the dam-
age liability that can be imposed on a defendant for most cases
involving false filing and publicity." The ceiling can be lifted,
however, if there has been misrepresentation with knowledge;
this, I guess, is to be distinguished from misrepresentation with
scienter, required initially for liability to arise.
Another provision that you should be aware of is section
1709, which covers investment adviser liability when there is no
purchase or sale.55 If there is a purchase or sale you look to sec-
tion 1703 of the Code," not to section 1709. Section 1709 deals
with the situation where the adviser himself is not actually
monly controlled company.
51. Id. § 1707(a).
52. Id. § 1708(d).
53. Id. § 1604(c).
54. Id. § 1708(c)(2). This section limits the damages with respect to a particular
filing so far as each defendant is concerned, to the greatest of:
(A) $100,000;
(B) 1 percent (to a maximum of $1,000,000) of gross revenues in the
defendant's last fiscal year before the filing of the action if the defendant is
a company; or
(C) any profit specified in section 1708(a)(1)(B) or 1708(a)(2)(B),
but section 1708(c)(2) does not apply if the plaintiff proves a misrepresentation
made with knowledge by the particular defendant, nor does it apply with respect
to the registrant to the extent that an offering statement or amendment covers a
distribution by or for its account or benefit, or with respect to an underwriter.
55. Id. § 1709 (c)(1). This section provides that
[a]n investment adviser who-
(1) violates section 1602(a)(4) by means of a fraudulent act, or a mis-
representation made with scienter; or
(2) fails to correct a statement of a material fact (A) as required by
section 1602(b)(1)(D) if he acquired scienter with respect to the subsequent
event there referred to as of a time sufficiently in advance of his client's
acting on the basis of the statement to have had a reasonable opportunity
to make the correction, or (B) to reflect the investment adviser's acquisition
of scienter, as of such a time, with respect to a misrepresentation previously
made,
is liable to his client for any loss caused by the violation or failure to correct.
CODE RECOMMENDATION suggests a change from the scienter test now present to a test
which looks to an act "without reasonable justification or excuse." CODE REcOMMENDA-
TION, supra note 1, at 1500.
56. ALI FED. Sac. CODE § 1703 (1980). For the text of this section, see note 22
supra.
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purchasing or selling, but where there is fraud or misrepresenta-
tion in the advising relationship, and the advisee is selling or
purchasing.6 7
Section 1710 covers manipulation and stabilization." An-
other provision you should note is section 1713, which covers
proxy solicitations, acquisitions and tender offers.59 Again, if you
actually purchase and sell, you look to section 1703, not to sec-
tion 1713. If there is a misrepresentation or fraud where you
have not actually purchased or sold, you look to section 1713.60
Section 171461 is the analogue of section 16(b),62 the short
57. Id. § 1709(c). The changes suggested by the Commission and Professor Loss are
set forth at note 55 supra.
58. Id. § 1710.
59. Id. § 1713. This section provides that
(a) PROXY SOLIcrrATiON.-On proof in an action by the issuer, or a security
holder who has been or is about to be solicited or circularized within the meaning
of section 603(a), that the defendant has violated, is violating, or is about to vio-
late section 603, 604, 1602(a)(2), or 1602(b)(1)(B), a court may (1) enjoin a viola-
tion or further violation, (2) require compliance, (3) enjoin the use of proxies solic-
ited or given in violation or the consummation of action authorized by their use,
(4) set aside action so consummated, (5) award damages against the violator for
any loss caused by his violation, or (6) grant other appropriate relief (preliminary
or final), including a combination of the types of relief set forth in section 1713(a).
(b) AcQUISITONS AND TENDER OF vEs.-On proof in an action by the issuer of
a security that is the subject of a tender offer (or a proposed tender offer) or
whose acquisition requires a filing under section 605(b), a holder of such a security
(or of another security whose interests are adversely affected), a person who has
tendered a security pursuant to a tender offer, or a person who has made or pro-
poses to make a tender offer, that the defendant has violated, is violating, or is
about to violate section 605(b), 606, 607(e), 1602(a)(1) or (3), 1602(b)(1)(A) or (C),
1603(a), or 1613, a court may (1) enjoin a violation or further violation, (2) require
compliance, (3) enjoin the voting of securities acquired in violation or the consum-
mation of action authorized by their having been voted, (4) set aside action so
consummated, (5) award damages against the violator for any loss caused by his
violation, or (6) grant other appropriate relief (preliminary or final), including a
combination of the types of relief set forth in section 1713(b).
(c) ACTIONS By BuvERs AN SELauzs.-Section 1713 does not apply to the ex-
tent that any of sections 1703-1707 inclusive applies.
60. Id.
61. Id. § 1714(a). This section provides:
(a) LiABLtT.-For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information
that may have been obtained by a person within section 605(a) by reason of his
relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from a purchase and sale (or
sale and purchase), within a period of less than six months, of securities of a class
subject to that section inures to and is recoverable by the issuer without regard to
any intention on his part, in entering into the transaction, to hold the security
purchased or not to repurchase the security sold for at least six months.
19811
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term trading section. Professor Loss does change 16(b) consider-
ably." He nullifies the effect of three Supreme Court decisions
in one section, two of which are favorable to the plaintiff,6" and
one of which is favorable to the defendante 5 He clearly has a
62. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976). This section
provides in relevant part.
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his rela-
tionship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or
any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an ex-
empted security) within any period of less than six months, unless such security
was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall
inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part
of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of
holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a
period exceeding six months.
63. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1714, Comments (1) and (2) (1980). These comments
provide:
(1) The initial question is whether X16(b) should be preserved at all. Some
favor its repeal on several grounds: (a) that it is needlessly arbitrary to the point
of being quixotic; (b) that it has acted as a trap for the unwary; (c) that the Com-
mission has made insufficient use of its exemptive authority; and (d) that, most of
all, the jurisprudence that has developed under X Rule 10b-5 (and that is being
codified in large part) has rendered obsolete the concept of automatic recapture of
certain short-term profits of certain insiders.
(2) The Code proceeds on the theory, however, that X16(b) has a symbolic
significance that must be, and deserves to be, recognized. It accordingly codifies
the most important areas of the X16(b) jurisprudence, smoothing some of the
rough edges in the process without derogating from the basic genius of the section.
This partial codification-for example, the defenses in §§ 1714(g) and
1714(h)(1)-is not meant to preclude further judicial inventiveness in areas (like
options and rights) that remain uncodified. And, particularly with respect to the
uncodified portion of the jurisprudence, the Commission is expected to use its
expanded rulemaking authority in order to play a greater quasi-legislative role in
this area than it has in the past. See §§ 303 (exemptive authority) and 1804 (gen-
eral rulemaking authority, including authority to adopt interpretative rules).
64. Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232 (1976); Reliance
Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972). McKesson held that a
purchase, in a purchase-sale sequence, which results in that purchaser's holding more
than ten percent, does not fall within § 16(b). 423 U.S. at 235. Section 1714(d)(1) ex-
pressly abrogates this case. See ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1714, Comment 5 (1980).
Reliance held that a ten percent owner who sells his stock within six months of
purchase by two sales, where the first sale reduces the holdings to less than ten percent,
is not liable under § 16(b). 404 U.S. at 420. Section 1714(d)(1) also expressly overrules
this case. See ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1714, Comment 6 (1980).
65. Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962). In Blau the Court stated that a partner-
ship may deputize an individual partner to represent its interests as director of a corpo-
ration. Section 220(40) of the proposed Code overrules this by excluding "from the defi-
nition of 'director' a person who 'deputizes another person to be a director."' ALl FED.
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view of what 16(b) should be like, and his view differs from that
of the present law. Personally, I think that those changes are
good.
III. Summary
The main point to keep in mind when studying the pro-
posed Code is that section 1702 is the analogue of section '12(1)
strict liability and covers registration violations. Section 1703 is
the basic fraud and insider trading provision with important dif-
ferences between the face-to-face deal and the anonymous mar-
ket transaction. Section 1704 covers annual reports and offerings
by the issuer. The liability here is similar to section 11 liability,
but there is an arbitrary limit in section 1708(c) which can be
removed in certain circumstances. Section 1705 applies to filings
other than annual reports and offering statements. Section 1706
is the liability provision for what are basically secondary distri-
butions. If you keep this overview in mind and then look to sec-
tion 1708 for your measure of damages, you will have the basic
framework of the Code.
Part XVII is complex, but so is the present law. The Code
had the benefit of containing the complex law in one volume.
Someone new entering the field will not have to read one thou-
sand rule 10b-5 cases to find the standard. This is a real advan-
tage to new lawyers beginning the study of securities law.
I think Professor Loss should be commended for carefully
tailoring the mental state and the measure of damages to each
cause of action. He treats substantive violations in groups that
do make some sense, and he does resolve certain problems such
as the problem with the statute of limitations and other techni-
cal problems. It is an orderly scheme. If there is an argument for
the Code, I think one of the strongest is that this really is a
codification of what Professor Loss and his advisers believe is a
consensus position in these areas. It is set out so that someone
who has never known anything about the securities law could
read it. It is an incredible drafting accomplishment. You and I
may disagree with certain treatments of specific things. But it is
orderly; once you learn how to trace the substantive violations




first to Part XVII and then to the damage provisions, it does
present a coherent picture.
IV. Discussion
Question: Do you think the Code has a chance of being
passed?
Mr. Pozen: I really can't say whether or not it would pass. I
think that it should be given full consideration. I thought that
you were going to ask me another question which I will answer
anyway and that is, whether the Code is generally a good idea.
My position on the Code depends very greatly on what actually
winds up in it at the end. If there are twenty provisions that are
changed in a certain way I might think that the Code is a great
document. If, on the other hand, there are twenty other provi-
sions that change in another way I might think that the Code is
a terrible document. I find the whole notion of having two days
of generic hearings on the Code to be somewhat fruitless. Even a
person like Lew Lowenfels, who has very strong feelings about
the Commission's rule-making powers, might think the Code is a
good thing if two or three of those rule-making powers were
changed. It is a complex document, and I find it very hard to
take generic positions for or against the Code.
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